Yesterday, the National Transportation Safety Board met to explore the safety impact of "glass cockpits" in small general aviation aircraft. I watched the Web feed, as the meeting turned out far more interesting than I expected.
The Board received internal staff studies that seemed to show that the overall accident rate for glass cockpit light planes was lower than that of conventionally equipped aircraft, but the rate of accidents with fatal outcomes was higher, with the Safety Board, "concluding that single engine airplanes equipped with glass cockpits had no better overall safety record than airplanes with conventional instrumentation."
The reports further showed that pilots of EFIS aircraft involved in accidents were older, had more flying hours, were more likely to hold Instrument ratings and be flying in IMC, and at the time of the accident, likely were flying a longer range mission than accident pilots flying airplanes with round dial instruments.
For those with long memories, the study nearly perfectly reflects the results of previous comparison of single- and multi-engine aircraft accidents, with the more capable multi-engine aircraft having a lower accident rate but a higher rate of accidents with a fatal outcome.
The presentation of the study was followed by the usual NTSB dialog, raising issues of training, standardization of display formats, failure modes, etc. Member Robert L. Sumwalt made his usual references to his airline experience, including glass cockpit time on the Fokker 100 and Airbus. Chairman Hersman reported how task-overloaded she felt flying approaches in a small plane with a glass cockpit.
When it came time to adopt the pre-written recommendations, the session foundered on the wording of recommendation #4, which Vice Chairman Christopher A. Hart felt could be interpreted as requiring the FAA to endorse or certify pilots for not only aircraft category, class and type, but also for aircraft model, electronic Primary Flight Display model (if so equipped) and the software version.
The so-far, well-choreographed event came off the rails at that point with Hersman feebly attempting to stay on script, saying the FAA would likely propose an alternative approach to the unworkable recommendation. This didn't sit well with Hart and the discussion became so sharp (especially regarding whether the NTSB staff or Board Members should write findings and recommendations) that the audio and video Web feed was cut for several minutes, and resumed after the recommendation had been hastily reworded by the staff.
Here are the recommendations verbatim from the NTSB release at 8:30 last night:
"Based on the study findings, the NTSB made six safety recommendations to the FAA:
- enhance pilot knowledge and training requirements;
- require manufacturers to provide pilots with information to better manage system failures;
- incorporate training elements regarding electronic primary flight displays into training materials and aeronautical knowledge requirements;
- incorporate training elements regarding electronic primary flight displays into initial and recurrent flight proficiency requirements for pilots of small light general aviation airplanes equipped with those systems, that address variations in equipment design and operations of such displays;
- support equipment-specific pilot training programs by developing guidance for the use of glass cockpit simulators other than those that are approved by the FAA as flight training devices; and
- inform the general aviation community about the importance of reporting malfunctions or defects with electronic flight, navigation and control systems through the Service Difficulty Reporting system."
The presentations are posted at: http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2010/Safety-Study-Glass-Cockpit/presentations.htm
NTSB said the complete safety study will be available at www.ntsb.gov in several weeks.
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